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A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CONFLICTS BETWEEN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND FREEDOM OF




In July of 1990, during the summer after his first year at college,
James Dale was expelled from the Boy Scouts and his position as an
assistant troopmaster was revoked.1 Dale, an exemplary scout who
had achieved the prestigious rank of Eagle Scout the year before, was
expelled because the Boy Scouts had an unpublicized policy that
"specifically [forbade] membership to homosexuals. '2
Dale thus joined the ranks of gay scouts across the country who
have been expelled or ostracized from an organization that purports
to welcome all boys. Dale filed suit against the Boy Scouts, alleging
discrimination in violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimi-
nation.3 The Boy Scouts contended that application of New Jersey's
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2002;
B.A., University of Massachusetts at Amherst, 1999. I would like to thank Professor Mark
D. Rosen for his insightful comments during the writing process.
1. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 645 (2000).
2. Id. at 645, 665.
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-4 (West 2000). The complaint also alleged common-law causes
of action, which were dismissed early in the litigation.
In a series of cases prior to Dale, the Boy Scouts' discriminatory membership policies
with respect to homosexuals, females, and atheists were brought to court in various states. In
each of these cases, the Boy Scouts' membership decisions were protected, usually because the
court found that the state's antidiscrimination policy did not apply to the organization. See, e.g.,
Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218 (Cal. 1998) (holding that the Boy
Scouts is not a business establishment within the meaning of the antidiscrimination provisions of
the California Civil Rights Act); Merino v. San Diego County Council of the Boy Scouts, Nos.
D021969, D022829, 1997 WL 1145151, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. May 21, 1997); Schwenk v. Boy
Scouts of Am., 551 P.2d 465, 469 (Or. 1976) (holding that "place of public accommodation"
language in state statute was not intended to include the Boy Scouts for purposes of applications
by girls for membership); Seabourn v. Coronado Area Council, Boy Scouts of Am., 891 P.2d 385
(Kan. 1995) (holding that the Boy Scouts is not a public accommodation within the meaning of
Kansas Act Against Discrimination, and the organization may exclude from positions of adult
leadership persons who are unwilling to profess belief in and duty to a supreme being). But see
Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724,
at *1 (Chicago Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996) (holding that the Boy Scouts'
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law would be unconstitutional because its membership decisions were
protected by the First Amendment.
4
The case reached the United States Supreme Court, where Jus-
tice Rehnquist's majority opinion held that application of the
antidiscrimination law had indeed violated the Boy Scouts' First
Amendment freedom of expressive association.5 Strong dissenting
opinions observed that the decision in Dale differed markedly from
prior freedom of association cases,6 and noted that until Dale, the
Court had "never once found a claimed right to associate in the
selection of members to prevail in the face of a State's antidiscrimi-
nation law."'7
While the Dale result reflects "our nation's commitment to
protect freedom of speech,"'8 the Court is indeed stepping onto new
ground in Dale. The controversial 5-4 opinion raises, but leaves
unanswered, important questions about the tension between freedom
of expressive association and antidiscrimination laws. This Comment
posits that Dale is an important development in First Amendment
expressive association jurisprudence, and suggests a framework that
provides absolute First Amendment protection of membership
decisions for purely expressive associations, minimal First Amend-
ment protection for purely commercial organizations' membership
decisions, and a balancing of state interests and group interests for
hybrid commercial-expressive groups. Absolute First Amendment
protection of membership decisions for purely expressive associations
is justified in light of First Amendment objectives, and balancing
governmental and organizational interests prevents excessive
politicization of individuals' personal characteristics.
Part I of this Comment presents an overview of the law pertain-
ing to freedom of expressive association before Dale, and Part II
contains a summary of the opinions in Dale. Part III analyzes Dale in
the context of prior expressive association decisions and proposes a
framework for understanding the developing doctrine. Part IV
addresses the politicization of identity characteristics in conflicts
between expressive association and antidiscrimination laws.
discriminatory employment policy violates Chicago Human Rights Ordinance).
4. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
5. Id. at 644.
6. Id. at 678-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 679.




I. CONFLICTS BETWEEN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAWS AND
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION BEFORE DALE
Freedom of expressive association is the right to assemble to
engage in activities protected by the First Amendment: the exercise
of speech, assembly, religion, and petition for redress of grievances.9
The freedom is deemed essential to preserve political and cultural
diversity and to shield dissident expression from suppression by the
majority.10 Because freedom of expressive association hinges on
expression, an organization cannot prevail on an expressive
association claim unless it establishes that it engages in expressive
activity protected by the First Amendment." A brief examination of
the Supreme Court's freedom of expressive association jurisprudence
before Dale will put the decision into context.
A. Freedom of Association Balanced against the State Interest in
Eradicating Discrimination: The Roberts Trilogy12
The Supreme Court's freedom of expressive association juris-
prudence before Dale balanced state interests in ending discrimi-
nation against organizations' interests in freedom of association. The
Court's analysis carefully scrutinized groups' contentions regarding
their expressive activities, but readily accepted the states' interests in
ending discrimination as compelling. To invoke the balancing test,
9. Dale, 530 U.S. at 678; Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S.
537, 544 (1987). Freedom of association falls into two categories: freedom of intimate
association and freedom of expressive association. Freedom of intimate association generally
refers to human relationships such as marriage, childbirth, the raising and education of children,
and cohabitation with one's relatives. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-
18, 620 (1984); Duarte, 481 U.S. at 544. Because of its size and nonselectivity, freedom of
intimate association is not implicated by the application of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination to the Boy Scouts. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 646-48.
10. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647. Freedom of expressive association was first recognized as an
implied fundamental right in the 1958 case of NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S.
449 (1958). It is interesting to note that the doctrine of freedom of expressive association
originally protected civil rights groups but has more recently been used as a defense to the
application of civil rights laws.
11. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 648. In Hishon v. King & Spalding, a former associate of a law
firm sued the firm under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for employment
discrimination when the firm refused to consider her for partnership on the basis of her gender
and ultimately terminated her position. 467 U.S. 69 (1984). One of the firm's defenses was that
its partnership decisions were protected by freedom of expressive association. Id. at 78. The
Court recognized that a law firm's activities can be expressive, but held that the firm had not
shown how its expression would be inhibited by considering the complainant on her merits. Id.
12. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987), and New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New
York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988), are referred to jointly as the Roberts trilogy.
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the organization had to show that the antidiscrimination law in
question implicated its First Amendment rights.
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees13 and Board of Directors of
Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte,'4 the Supreme Court
considered two civic organizations' claims that the First Amendment
freedom of expressive association protected their men-only
membership policies from the application of state antidiscrimination
laws. In both cases, the Court held that requiring the clubs to admit
women would not significantly affect the organizations' activities and
that the states' compelling interest in eradicating discrimination
against women justified any impact on members' freedom of
expressive association.,'
The Court's strong preference for antidiscrimination laws was
evident in Roberts. Though primarily a business organization, one of
the Jaycees' written objectives was to "promote and foster the growth
and development of young men's civic organizations.., and to
develop true friendship and understanding among young men of all
nations.""6  Despite the unequivocally gendered language of the
organization's bylaws, the Roberts opinion held that compelling the
Jaycees to accept women as members "require[d] no change in the
Jaycees' creed of promoting the interests of young men," and that the
Jaycees had not demonstrated that Minnesota's Human Rights Act
imposed "serious burdens on the male members' freedom of
expressive association."17 The Court rejected the Jaycees' argument
that the organization's public expression would have a different effect
if group membership were extended to women, calling it an
"unsupported generalization[] about the relative interests and
perspectives of men and women. '18 Similarly, the Duarte court found
that admitting women would have no significant effect on the Rotary
Club's expressive activities because the organization had traditionally
chosen to remain silent on public issues. 9 In a footnote, the Court
dismissed the group's contentions that its men-only membership
policy enhanced group dynamics and allowed the organization to
13. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
14. 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
15. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 627; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 548-49.
16. 468 U.S. at 612-13, 616. The Jaycees was originally established as the Junior Chamber
of Commerce. Id. at 612.
17. Id. at 626-27.
18. Id. at 627-28.
19. 481 U.S. at 548.
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operate effectively in foreign countries with varied cultures and social
mores. 20
Roberts and Duarte concluded that state laws prohibiting dis-
crimination in places of public accommodation on the basis of gender
represent compelling state interests unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, and that the state interest could not be accomplished through
less restrictive means.21  The Roberts opinion gave a lengthy
explanation of the social and personal harms addressed by antidis-
crimination laws. 22 Both Roberts and Duarte balanced the minimal
impact on the organizations' freedom of expressive association
against the state interest in eradicating discrimination and concluded
that the organizations' First Amendment rights were not violated by
the antidiscrimination laws. 23
Although the Court again struck down a First Amendment
challenge to an antidiscrimination law in New York State Club Ass'n
v. City of New York, the Court explained in dicta that it was possible
for a group to prevail on an expressive association claim against an
antidiscrimination law.24  Antidiscrimination laws, the Court
explained, are meant to prevent organizations from using specified
characteristics as "shorthand measures" in place of "legitimate
[membership] criteria. 25 Thus, an association that could "show that
it is organized for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be
able to advocate its desired viewpoints nearly as effectively if it
cannot confine its membership to those who share the same sex, for
example, or the same religion," would present a strong freedom of
expressive association claim in the face of an antidiscrimination law.26
20. Id. at 541, 549 n.8. The footnote observes that women already participated in Rotary
Club meetings and activities before the enactment of the antidiscrimination law, and states that
the Rotary Club's effectiveness as an international organization will not be undermined since
the judgment only applies to California. Id. at 549 n.8.
21. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549.
22. 468 U.S. at 623-26.
23. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549.
24. 487 U.S. 1 (1988). The case involved a facial challenge to a provision of New York
City's Human Rights Law, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, creed, color,
national origin, or sex by any club with more than four hundred members that "provide[d]
regular meal service and regularly receive[d] payment for dues, fees, use of space, facilities,
services, meals or beverages directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers for the
furtherance of trade or business." Id. at 6, quoting N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986).
25. Id. at 13.
26. Id. Hurley explained that the application of the antidiscrimination law was upheld
because compelled access to the public benefits provided by the organization did not "trespass
on the organization's message." 515 U.S. 557, 580 (1995).
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The Court did not encounter a group that fits this description until
Dale.
B. Freedom of Speech Balanced against State Interests: Hurley v.
Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston
In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of
Boston,7 state courts had applied Massachusetts' public accommo-
dations law to require the organizers of Boston's Saint Patrick's Day
Parade to allow the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston (GLIB) to march in the parade behind a banner identifying
the group by name, contrary to the parade organizers' wishes. 8 The
organizers contended that the First Amendment freedom of speech
protected their decisions about who should be permitted to
participate in the parade. The Supreme Court unanimously held that
states may not require the organizers of a parade to include a group
communicating a message the organizers do not wish to convey.
29
The Court made clear that the First Amendment protects expression
beyond written or spoken words and that "a narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection."
' 3
Simply put, freedom of expression entails a right to decide what not
to say.31 As for the validity of the antidiscrimination statute itself,
including the provision relating to sexual orientation, the Hurley
court stated that such provisions are "well within the State's usual
power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given
group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general
matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments.
'3 2
Expressive association claims are typically treated differently
from freedom of speech claims, but the Hurley court noted that the
outcome would be the same under a freedom of expressive asso-
27. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
28. Id. at 561-66. While participation in the parade was largely open to anyone who
applied, the organizers of the parade, the South Boston Allied War Veterans Council, had also
excluded the Ku Klux Klan and an antibusing group. Id. at 562. The parade organizers did not
seek to exclude homosexuals from the parade: the disagreement stemmed from GLIB's intent
to march carrying an identifying banner. Id. at 572.
29. Id. at 559.
30. Id. at 569.
31. Id. at 573 (quoting Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 16
(1986)). "While the law is free to promote all sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is
not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
discouraging a disfavored one, however enlightened either purpose may strike the government."
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 579.
32. Id. at 572.
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ciation analysis.33 The opinion stated that "GLIB could.., be refused
admission as an expressive contingent with its own message just as
readily as a private club could exclude an applicant whose manifest
views were at odds with a position taken by the club's existing
members. 34 The unanimous Court thus analogized the exclusion of
GLIB and its banner to the legitimate membership criteria described
in New York State Club Ass'n.35 Hurley's flexible doctrinal approach
to freedom of expression and expressive association, together with
Roberts, Duarte, and New York State Club Ass'n, set the stage for Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale.
II. BoY SCOUTS OFAMERICA V. DALE: CHANGING THE RULES OF
THE GAME?
A. James Dale's Expulsion from the Boy Scouts
James Dale became a Boy Scout in 1981, when he was ten, and
remained a Scout until the age of eighteen. 36 In 1988, he achieved the
prestigious rank of Eagle Scout, an honor that only 3 percent of all
Boy Scouts attain.37 In 1989, Dale applied for adult membership in
the Boy Scouts, and he was appointed assistant scoutmaster of Troop
73.38
He enrolled the same year at Rutgers University. There, he
recognized that he was gay, and became involved with the Rutgers
University Lesbian/Gay Alliance. 39 In 1990, Dale attended a seminar
addressing the psychological and health needs of lesbian and gay
teenagers. ° A newspaper covering the event published Dale's
photograph along with an interview and a caption identifying him as
co-president of the Rutgers University Lesbian/Gay Alliance.41
33. Id. at 580.
34. Id. at 580-81.
35. Compare id. at 580-81, with New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13.
36. 530 U.S. at 644. Dale was a Boy Scout for the maximum period of time allowed: scouts
are between the ages of ten and eighteen. Before he reached age ten, Dale was a member of the
Cub Scouts, an organization associated with the Boy Scouts.
37. Id. at 644, 665.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 644-45.
40. Id. at 645.
41. Kinga Borondy, Seminar Addresses Needs of Homosexual Teens, STAR-LEDGER
(NEWARK), July 8, 1990, § 2, at 11.
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Shortly thereafter, Dale received a letter from local Boy Scout
executive James Kay revoking Dale's adult membership and his
position as assistant scoutmaster.42 When Dale wrote back to ask why
his membership had suddenly been revoked, Kay responded that the
Boy Scouts "specifically forbid[s] membership to homosexuals.
43
Dale had not revealed his sexual orientation to anyone affiliated with
the Boy Scouts, and had not indicated that he planned to discuss his
sexuality with the troop members.44
Dale sued the Boy Scouts in 1992, alleging that its revocation of
his membership on the basis of his sexual orientation constituted a
violation of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination.4
B. Dale v. Boy Scouts of America in the New Jersey State Courts
The trial court found that New Jersey's public accommodations
law did not apply to the Boy Scouts because the organization was not
a "place of public accommodation" within the meaning of the law.
46
Even if the Boy Scouts were a place of public accommodation, the
trial court reasoned, it is a distinctly private group exempted from
coverage under New Jersey's law 7.4  The trial court further found that
the First Amendment freedom of association prevented New Jersey
from forcing the Boy Scouts to accept Dale as a member because the
Boy Scouts' prohibition of "active homosexuality" was unequivocal.
48
The New Jersey Superior Court's Appellate Division reversed,
holding that New Jersey's public accommodations law did apply to
the Boy Scouts, and that Dale's expulsion constituted a violation of
42. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 665 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43. Id. The Boy Scouts is a national, nonprofit membership organization chartered by
Congress. As of December 1992, the BSA reported 3,453,315 youth members and 1,172,485
adults registered in 123,045 traditional scout units. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270,
274 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). Each United States president since Taft has acted as
honorary president of the club. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1212 (N.J. 1999).
The federal government supplies facilities, equipment, and services to the club. See id. at 1212-
13.
44. In fact, troop leaders are strongly discouraged from discussing sexuality with their
charges. See 530 U.S. at 654; Id. at 669 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Scoutmaster Handbook
(1972)). The majority opinion notes that the Boy Scouts dispute this statement with contrary
evidence. Id. at 655.
45. Id. at 645. Dale's complaint also alleged common law claims, the dismissal of which
was affirmed by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court and by the New
Jersey Supreme Court. 706 A.2d 270, 283 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); 734 A.2d at 1219
(N.J. 1999).
46. 530 U.S. at 645.
47. Id.
48. Id.; Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 284-85 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998).
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the law.49 The court assumed, arguendo, that the application of New
Jersey's law to the Boy Scouts implicated the First Amendment.50
The Appellate Division found that application of the law would not
significantly affect the Boy Scouts' expression." The Boy Scout Oath
states that Scouts should be "morally straight" and "clean," but the
court found no indication that those statements refer to
heterosexuality, apart from position statements the organization
issued after Dale's expulsion.5 2  Moreover, the position the Boy
Scouts advocated had not been publicized in any form when it
expelled Dale, most members were unaware of the existence of such a
policy, and the policy contradicts the beliefs of many sponsoring
groups. These facts provided further evidence that application of
New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination would not affect the Boy
Scouts' expression. 3
The Appellate Division dismissed the Boy Scouts' claims that
Hurley was dispositive. Unlike Hurley, where both the parade and
GLIB's desire to participate were pure speech,5 4 the application of the
antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts in Dale would not "alter the
content of the [Boy Scouts'] viewpoint."55 Finally, the court held that
self-identification as gay could not constitute "expressive activity" on
the basis of which the organization could expel Dale.
56
The New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the
Appellate Division.57 Because Dale's membership and leadership had
49. Dale, 706 A.2d at 280-81, 283. A separate opinion concurred with the majority in the
Appellate Division that the Law Against Discrimination required that the Boy Scouts restore
Dale's membership, but dissented insofar as a leadership position was concerned. Id. at 294-95
(Landau, J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Landau agreed that the Law Against
Discrimination prohibits the Boy Scouts from revoking Dale's membership, but did not believe
that New Jersey could require the Boy Scouts to reappoint Dale to a leadership position without
running afoul of the First Amendment. Id.
50. Id. at 287-88.
51. Id. at 288.
52. Id. at 289-90. The Boy Scouts was embroiled in litigation challenging its antigay policy
at the time. See Curran v. Mt. Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d 218 (Cal.
1998). New Jersey's Appellate Division suggested that the statements were "a litigation stance
taken by the [Boy Scouts] rather than an expression of a fundamental belief concerning its
purposes." Dale, 706 A.2d at 290.
53. Dale, 706 A.2d at 290-91.
54. Id. at 293.
55. Id. The court wrote that Dale's "public acknowledgement that he is a homosexual is
hardly comparable to a banner in a parade declaring his pride in his homosexuality." Id.
56. Id. "We... cannot accept the proposition that the [Boy Scouts] has a constitutional
privilege of excluding a gay person when the sole basis for the exclusion is [that person's]
exercise of his own First Amendment right to speak honestly about himself." Id.
57. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999).
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been revoked as a result of his sexual orientation, the Boy Scouts had
violated New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination.58 Citing the
Roberts trilogy, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that application
of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination does not implicate the
Boy Scouts' freedom of expressive association. The Court reasoned
that since the record did not show that a purpose of the organization
is to promote the view that homosexuality is immoral, being forced to
include Dale would not significantly affect the group's ability to carry
out its purposes.5 9
The New Jersey Supreme Court distinguished the facts of Hurley
on two grounds. First, Dale did not attend Boy Scout meetings
carrying a banner announcing his sexual orientation.6° Second, Boy
Scout leadership, unlike a parade, is not a form of pure speech in that
Dale did not participate in the organization to express a point of view,
the way marchers in a parade do.61 The court rejected the idea that
including Dale required the Boy Scouts to endorse any message.62
C. The United States Supreme Court's Analysis of Dale
Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Dale found that the
application of New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination to the Boy
Scouts violated the First Amendment because forcing the Boy Scouts
to include Dale would require the organization to send a message it
did not wish to send.63 First, the Court found that the Boy Scouts'
mission of inculcating values is clearly expressive.6 Second, including
Dale would significantly affect the Boy Scouts' ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints. 65 Finally, because including Dale would
require the Boy Scouts to send a message about homosexuality, the
58. Id. at 1218-19.
59. Id. at 1223.
60. Id. at 1229.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. 640, 643-44. The Court basically found that the
conditions set forth in New York State Club Ass'n had been satisfied. For a discussion of the
conditions set forth in that case, see New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S.
1, 13 (1988).
64. Dale, 530 U.S. at 648-50. The Dale court found it "undisputable that an association
that seeks to transmit such a system of values engages in expressive activity," and stated that
protected group expression need not be advocacy, and may be public or private. Id. at 650.
65. Id. at 649-57.
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application of New Jersey's antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts
was unconstitutional. 66
The Court accepted the Boy Scouts' arguments regarding the
nature of the organization's expression and the significant burden
that Dale's inclusion would have on its expression.67 The Court gave
complete deference to the Boy Scouts' assertion that Dale's inclusion
would negatively affect its expression.68 Despite its deference to the
group's claims about what would impair the group's expression, the
Court declared that an expressive association cannot "erect a shield
against antidiscrimination laws simply by asserting that mere
acceptance of a member from a particular group would impair its
message." 69  The Boy Scouts' claim was not fictitious, the Court
determined, because Dale admitted that he is a community leader
who is open and honest about his sexual orientation.70 Because the
Boy Scouts refuses to "promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior," Dale's presence would interfere with the Boy
Scouts' choice "not to propound a point of view contrary to its
beliefs."7'
The Court concluded that "[t]he state interests embodied in New
Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a severe
intrusion on the Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive
association. 7 2 Although the Court had earlier recited the test set out
in Roberts,73 it recognized that its deference to the Boy Scouts' claims
66. Id. at 659.
67. Id. at 651-53. The Court made clear that it would be improper for a court to evaluate
conflicting Boy Scout policies. Id. at 651.
68. Id. at 651. The opinion states:
The Boy Scouts asserts that it "teaches that homosexual conduct is not morally
straight" and that it does "not want to promote homosexual conduct as a legitimate
form of behavior." We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion. We need not inquire further
to determine the nature of the Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality.
Id. (citations omitted). However, the Court went on to examine an unpublicized 1978 internal
Boy Scout memorandum, position statements issued after Dale's expulsion, and the existence of
other litigation on its antigay membership policy "on the question of the sincerity of the
professed beliefs." Id. This examination obscures the Court's actual approach, and fuels
concerns, addressed infra Part III.B.3, that organizations will be able to use the First
Amendment freedom of expressive association as an easy justification for violation of
antidiscrimination laws, as long as the organization can produce a document explaining the
organization's discriminatory policy.
69. Id. at 653.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 659.
73. Id. at 647-48.
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more closely approximated the approach taken in Hurley.74 The Dale
court distinguished the facts of Roberts and Duarte because, in those
cases, the Court found that enforcement of the statute would not
materially interfere with the ideas the organization sought to
express.
75
Finally, Rehnquist's opinion addressed the flaws in the New
Jersey Supreme Court's analysis. First, the First Amendment's
protections of expressive activity are not limited to association for the
purpose of disseminating a certain message. 76 The Boy Scouts did not
need to prove that a primary purpose of the organization was to
promote the idea that homosexuality is immoral to be entitled to First
Amendment protection. Second, even if Scout leaders are discour-
aged from talking about sexual matters with Scouts, rolemodeling-
the manner of expression used by the Scouts-is protected. 77 Third,
the New Jersey Supreme Court wrongly assigned relevance to the fact
that not all members agree with the Boy Scouts' position on
homosexuality. 78 "The fact that the organization does not trumpet its
views from the housetops, or that it tolerates dissent within its ranks,
does not mean that its views receive no First Amendment pro-
tection," wrote Rehnquist.
79
D. The Dale Dissents
The new approaches of the majority in Dale provided ample
room for strong dissents, representing four of the nine Supreme
Court justices. Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined Justice
Stevens' dissent. Stevens would have held that New Jersey's Law
Against Discrimination does not implicate the Boy Scouts' consti-
tutional rights because it "does not impose any serious burdens on
[the Boy Scouts'] collective effort on behalf of its shared goals, nor
does it force the organization to communicate any message that it
does not wish to endorse." 8 His dissent focused extensively on the
lack of shared goals or a common moral stance on homosexuality
within the organization and the fact that the Boy Scouts' message
74. Id. at 659.
75. Id. at 657-58. Of course, the simplicity of this reasoning does not explain why the
Court carefully scrutinized the organizations' claims in Roberts and Duarte.
76. Id. at 655.
77. ld.
78. Id. at 655-56.
79. Id. at 656.
80. Id. at 664-65 (citations omitted).
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regarding homosexuality was not publicly expressed. 81 Justice
Stevens's opinion expressed astonishment at the majority's deference
to the Boy Scouts' litigation posture, and said that a court must
perform independent analysis of a group's message.8 2 Otherwise,
genuine freedom of association claims will be indistinguishable from
claims seeking to protect nonexpressive private discrimination, and
civil rights legislation will be rendered useless.
83
Justice Stevens's dissent found Dale indistinguishable from
Roberts and Duarte, and noted that Dale represents the first instance
in which the Court upheld a freedom of association claim over a state
antidiscrimination law. In order to reach a balancing of state and
group interests, Stevens wrote, "the organization must at least show it
has adopted and advocated an unequivocal position inconsistent with
a position advocated or epitomized by the person whom the
organization seeks to exclude. '" 4  The dissent found Hurley
inapplicable for the same reasons expressed by the New Jersey
Supreme Court: by participating in the Boy Scouts, Dale did not
express a message in the same way that GLIB expressed a message by
participating in the parade carrying a banner, and it was not likely
that Dale's speech would be perceived as the organization's speech.85
According to Justice Stevens, because the Boy Scouts did not show
how its expression would be affected by New Jersey's antidiscrimi-
nation law, it was unnecessary to weigh the state and group interests
against each other, and the application of the antidiscrimination law
should have been upheld.86
Justice Souter's dissent, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer,
agreed with Stevens's argument that in order for an association to
prevail on a freedom of expressive association claim, it must
"identify[] a clear position to be advocated over time in an unequivo-
cal way. '87 To require less, Souter writes, "would convert the right of
expressive association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination
81. Id. at 665-78.
82. Id. at 685-86. Stevens believes that Roberts and Duarte show that it is not enough to
simply engage in some kind of expressive activity and adopt an exclusionary membership policy.
Furthermore, mere articulation of some connection between the group's expressive activities
and its exclusionary policy will not allow a group to prevail on an expressive association claim.
Id. at 680-84.
83. Id. at 686-87.
84. Id. at 687.
85. Id. at 693-95.
86. See id. at 663-65.
87. Id. at 701.
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law."88  Justice Souter noted that changing public perceptions of
homosexuality should not control the Boy Scouts' ability to establish
a freedom of expressive association claim.89
III. How DOES DALE FIT INTO THE PUZZLE OF EXPRESSIVE
ASSOCIATION?
The Dale court was highly protective of associational freedoms,
but did not explain why the Boy Scouts prevailed on their freedom of
expressive association claim though groups such as the Jaycees and
the Rotary Club had not succeeded in making very similar claims.
The Dale result is very difficult to square with the language of the
Roberts trilogy, and important distinctions can be drawn between the
circumstances in Dale and those in Hurley. Evaluating freedom of
expressive association claims by looking at a group's primary purpose
will help jurists and scholars understand the contributions Dale has
made to the development of freedom of expressive association
jurisprudence.
A. Dale and Precedent
1. The Roberts Trilogy and Dale
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale marks an important departure
from precedent because of its deference to the Boy Scouts' claims.
Once an organization has established that it engages in expressive
activity, 9° the analytical framework developed in Roberts, Duarte, and
New York State Club Ass'n consists of two main parts. First, the
organization must show that application of the antidiscrimination law
would significantly burden the organization's expressive activities.91
Upon a showing that application of an antidiscrimination law would
significantly burden its expression, the second part of the analysis is to
balance the group's interest in freedom of expression against the
government's interest in eradicating discrimination. 92
88. Id. at 701-02.
89. Id. at 700-02.
90. The various United States Supreme Court decisions readily accepted that the Boy
Scouts engaged in expressive activity.
91. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626 (1984); Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987).
92. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623, 628; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549.
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The Dale analysis did not follow the analytical framework laid
out in the Roberts trilogy. With respect to the first part of the
analysis, the opinion concluded that a connection existed between the
Boy Scouts' expression and the exclusionary policy without analyzing
the Boy Scouts' claims regarding the nature of its expression and the
effects that application of the antidiscrimination law would have on
that expression. The Court had been very critical of such claims in
Roberts and Duarte, and had required detailed explanations of how
allowing membership to women would change the group's expression,
ultimately rejecting such arguments.93 If the Dale Court had followed
Roberts and Duarte closely, it would likely have concluded that since
scout leaders are directed not to speak to their troops about matters
of sexuality, the inclusion of gay scout leaders would have no effect
on the Boy Scouts' expression.
9 4
The Dale opinion departed from the second part of the Roberts
framework altogether. When balancing the group's interest in
freedom of expression against the state's interest in eradicating
discrimination, the state's interest must be compelling, unrelated to
the suppression of ideas, and the law must be no more restrictive than
necessary to achieve the state interest.95 The opinions in Roberts and
Duarte enunciate, without exception, the principle that a state's
interest in eradicating discrimination is compelling.96 Moreover,
Hurley specifically addressed a law that prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation, and found that, on its face, the law was
93. Compare Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-53, with Roberts, 468 U.S. 609, 626-28, and Duarte, 481
U.S. at 548-49.
94. In Roberts, the Court condemned reliance on unsupported generalizations about
differences between men and women. 468 U.S. at 627-28. The Duarte court stated that
compelling the Rotary Club to admit women would not affect expression because the group had
traditionally remained silent on political issues. 481 U.S. at 548.
95. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549.
96. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 624-26; Duarte, 481 U.S. at 549. Certainly, it would be
inappropriate for a court to determine that eradicating certain kinds of discrimination (e.g.,
discrimination against women) constitutes a compelling governmental interest, but eradicating
other types of discrimination (e.g., discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) does not
constitute a compelling governmental interest. Justice Stevens's and Justice Rehnquist's
opinions in Dale addressed this point in their exchange about the public perception of
homosexuality. Stevens argued that the public perception of homosexuality has changed
(presumably to show that eliminating discrimination against gays and lesbians is a compelling
governmental interest), but Rehnquist responds that public perception is not relevant to a
compelling governmental interest. Justice Souter's dissenting opinion agrees that public opinion
of homosexuality has nothing to do with the outcome of the case. This aspect of the Roberts
analysis may explain why the majority opinion reverted to a Hurley analysis rather than
continuing the Roberts analysis. If Rehnquist's opinion had used a Roberts analysis, he would
have had little choice but to concede that eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation is a compelling state interest.
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not directed at expression and did not impermissibly discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint.97 Using a Hurley-type analysis, the Dale Court
found that application of the antidiscrimination law would force the
Boy Scouts to send a message it did not wish to, and, consequently,
the majority opinion did not reach the Roberts balancing test. The
Court concluded that the state's interest could not outweigh the Boy
Scouts' interest in not being forced to express points of view it did not
wish to express. 98 Accordingly, the Court did not explain whether the
application of the antidiscrimination law to the Boy Scouts was struck
down because the state interest was related to the suppression of
ideas, because the Court had found that this state interest was not
compelling, or because although it was compelling and unrelated to
the suppression of ideas, it did not outweigh the Boy Scouts' interest
in freedom of expressive association.
Thus, the Dale court varied greatly from precedent in both major
portions of the Roberts trilogy analysis. First, the Dale court
accorded deference to the Boy Scouts' assertions about the nature of
its expression and the effects that the antidiscrimination law would
have on the expression. Second, the Dale court did not directly
address the conflict of interests between the Boy Scouts and New
Jersey as a result of that deference. To reconcile Dale and the
Roberts trilogy, there must be some distinction beyond the fact that
the Jaycees and Rotary Club did not argue that their expression
included the message that women do not belong in business.99 If the
Jaycees and Rotary Club had made such arguments under the
analysis used in Dale, the organizations would have been afforded
deference regarding the types of expression the organization engaged
in and the effect that admitting women would have on the group's
expression. Meeting these requirements would be easy for any group,
and would constitute an "easy trump" of antidiscrimination laws, in
the words of Justice Souter.1°° A more viable distinction between
Dale and the Roberts and Duarte opinions is the nature of the
97. 515 U.S. 557, 572 (1995). The Court noted that rather than focusing on expression, the
antidiscrimination law in question focused on the act of discrimination in the provision of
publicly available goods, privileges, and services. The constitutional violation in Hurley was not
created by the antidiscrimination law itself, but by its application to a group's expression (a
parade). Id. at 573.
9& Dale, 530 U.S. at 654-55.
99. Presumably, most organizations with discriminatory membership policies could find a
document that referred to or justified (however obliquely) the exclusionary policy, similar to the
Boy Scouts' 1978 internal memo.
100. Dale, 530 U.S. at 702 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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organizations involved-the Boy Scouts is a primarily expressive
organization, the Jaycees and Rotary Club are not. The Dale Court
does not focus on this variance, but the distinction is highly relevant.
2. Hurley and Dale
The Hurley decision made clear that although the case was de-
cided on free speech rather than expressive association grounds,
freedom of speech and freedom of expressive association are so
closely related that either analysis could be applied to a given case,
and the outcome under each test would often be the same. 1'0 The
intersection of the two concepts is logical in Dale, but the Supreme
Court majority opinion did not effectively address the arguments in
the dissenting and lower court opinions that Hurley is distinguishable
because it is a pure speech rather than a freedom of expressive
association case.
Applying the maxim that freedom of expression entails the
freedom not to speak invites inquiry as to whether Dale's inclusion
would require the Boy Scouts to make any expression about
homosexuality. Clearly, the decision not to speak about
homosexuality is as expressive as the decision to speak against it.102
Yet strong arguments have been made that permitting James Dale, an
Eagle Scout, to continue as an assistant troopmaster would not
require the Boy Scouts to express anything.13  Certainly, the
organization is not expected to embrace all of the opinions and
activities of all of its troopmasters.1°4 However, the principal reason
that Hurley is applicable is that, unlike the Jaycees and the Rotary
Club, the Boy Scouts' sole purpose is to inculcate its set of values into
young people. Whether fire building or knot tying, the Boy Scouts'
101. Hurley, 515 U.S. at 580-81; see supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text. Darren
Hutchinson decried the approach in Hurley, partly because of its potential to "disturb" the
Roberts framework. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Accommodating Outness: Hurley, Free Speech,
and Gay and Lesbian Equality, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 85, 91, 102 (1998). While Dale may have
proven that Hurley would have an important effect on the development of freedom of
expressive association case law, this Comment suggests that the Roberts framework has not
been "disturbed," but that it has been expanded upon to more adequately protect the
association of all groups, regardless of the group's message.
102. This concept is discussed infra Part III.B.4.a. Cf. STANLEY FISH, THERE'S NO SUCH
THING AS FREE SPEECH 31-50 (1994) (explaining that a non-Western university curriculum is
no more political than an all-Western curriculum).
103. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 684-85 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734
A.2d 1196, 1229 (N.J. 1999); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 706 A.2d 270, 293 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1998).
104. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 690-91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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activities are as expressive as a parade because they are inextricably
tied to the inculcation of values. Any nonexpressive activity the
organization engages in is merely incidental to the expressive activity.
As an expressive association, the Boy Scouts should have the absolute
decision-making authority as to who will be permitted to partici-
pate. 105
The dissenting justices emphasized the fact that Dale did not
seek to participate in the Boy Scouts to "make a point" about
sexuality the way the marchers in Hurley did. 1°6 This is irrelevant:
where an organization's freedom of expression is abridged, the
would-be member's intentions are not part of the inquiry. According
to the Boy Scouts, troopmasters lead by example, so leaders' lifestyles
constitute an integral part of the organization's expression.' °7 When
the Dale majority opinion accepted the Boy Scouts' assertions at face
value without distinguishing between the Boy Scouts and other
associations, such as the Jaycees and the Rotary Club, the Dale
dissenters were horrified at this unquestioning acceptance of a party's
litigation stance.10 8 As will be shown, however, this acquiescence is
justified in the case of purely expressive associations.
B. A Comprehensive Approach to Reconciling Dale with Freedom of
Expressive Association Precedent
The disparity between the results and analysis in Dale and the
freedom of expressive association precedent can be resolved by
examining the cases through a framework that takes into account the
purpose of the organization. An organization that is purely
expressive will receive a great deal of deference when it claims that
application of a state law is violative of its First Amendment freedom
of expressive association. An organization that is primarily economic
should receive very little deference in First Amendment protection
claims. Where an organization's activities are mixed, Roberts-type
scrutiny and balancing should take place.
105. The case is complicated by the great degree of governmental support that the Boy
Scouts of America receives at the federal, state, and local levels. This problem is addressed in
the Conclusion, infra.
106. See Dale, 530 U.S. at 694-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting); 734 A.2d 1229 (N.J. 1999).
107. Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-50. This is further evidenced by the Boy Scouts' tolerance of
straight scout leaders who openly disagree with the organization's stance on homosexuality. See
id. at 655-56.
108. Id. at 685-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1. Justice O'Connor's Roberts Concurrence
Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees is a useful starting point for the framework proposed in this
Comment. Justice O'Connor wrote that the test employed by the
Roberts majority was simultaneously "overprotective of activities
undeserving of constitutional shelter and underprotective of
important First Amendment concerns."'1 9  The opinion expressed
concern that commercial associations, which should receive only
minimal constitutional protection, might satisfy the requirement that
antidiscrimination laws "substantially affect" their expression,
thereby gaining protection for discrimination by occasional expressive
activity. 110 At the other extreme, the analysis set forth in Roberts did
not afford purely expressive associations enough protection,
according to O'Connor."' "An association engaged exclusively in
protected expression enjoys First Amendment protection of both the
content of its message and the choice of its members" because the
definition of membership is coterminous with the creation of a
collective voice.1 2 Government interference with the development of
that voice is an unconstitutional manipulation of the content of public
discussion."3
When presented with associations that are neither primarily
expressive nor primarily commercial, Justice O'Connor's approach
would assess whether expressive or commercial activities predomi-
nate the association's operations, and evaluate predominantly
expressive associations' claims the same way that purely expressive
associations' claims would be evaluated." 4  A predominantly
commercial association that engaged in expressive activity would be
treated in the same manner as a commercial association that engaged
in no expressive activity at all. Recognizing that no simple test would
determine whether a group was predominantly expressive or
109. 468 U.S. 609, 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
110. See id. at 632, 634.
111. Id. at 633.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 634.
114. See id. at 635-36. Justice O'Connor writes:
[An association should be characterized as commercial ... when.., the association's
activities are not predominantly of the type protected by the First Amendment. It is
only when the association is predominantly engaged in protected expression that state
regulation of its membership will necessarily affect, change, dilute, or silence one
collective voice that would otherwise be heard.
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predominantly commercial, Justice O'Connor argued that making
such determinations was feasible if courts examine the purposes of
the association and the purposes of members joining the asso-
ciation.115 For example, in Hishon v. King & Spalding,116 it was clear
that the defendant, a large law firm, was primarily engaged in
commercial activity. There was, therefore, no need to evaluate a
connection between the firm's discriminatory employment practices
and the firm's speech or to weigh compelling state interests against
the firm's interest in expression.1" In Roberts, Justice O'Connor
easily concluded that the Jaycees should be treated as a commercial
association because, despite a "not insubstantial" amount of
protected speech, the group's activities were primarily commercial.
11 8
The approach advocated in this Comment uses Justice
O'Connor's framework to explain how Dale fits into a cohesive
freedom of expressive association jurisprudence.
2. The Spectrum Approach: Maximal Protection for Freedom of
Expression and for Antidiscrimination Laws
Organizations that fall between the extremes of primarily expres-
sive and primarily commercial are those hybrid associations whose
commercial and expressive activities are not engaged in solely to
facilitate the other type of activity. Although an association that is
primarily expressive is incidentally commercial because it enters into
the economic marketplace when it purchases uniforms and hires
people to clean and perform secretarial duties, these incidental
economic activities are pursued only to promote the organization's
expressive activity. Similarly, corporate expression pursued to
promote the business's economic activity is only incidentally
expressive and will not change the company's characterization as
primarily economic for the purposes of freedom of expressive
association analysis. Hybrid commercial-expressive associations are
engaged in independent economic and expressive activities.
A comprehensive approach to freedom of expressive association
recognizes the different degrees of government interest in eradicating
discrimination and group interest in freedom of expressive asso-
115. Id.
116. 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
117. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 637 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118. Id. at 639-40. Justice O'Connor quotes the "not insubstantial" language of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. at 640.
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ciation. Purely expressive groups should receive absolute First
Amendment protection, 119 and purely commercial associations'
expression should receive minimal protection. Between these two
extremes, a court's analysis should take into account the relative
degrees of interest on the part of the state and the association
asserting freedom of expressive association, as described in Roberts.
Using this approach, once a hybrid commercial-expressive asso-
ciation (such as the Jaycees or the Rotary Club or a large private club
which provides a forum for business transactions) establishes that it
engages in expressive activity, a court would evaluate the connection
between expression and exclusionary policy, the effects the
antidiscrimination law would have on the group's ability to advocate
public or private viewpoints, and the degree of government interest in
eradicating discrimination. The degree of state interest in eradicating
discrimination will vary with the type of benefit denied to excluded
individuals. This analysis would be informed by facts relating to the
amounts of expressive and commercial activities engaged in by the
organization, and the extent to which expressive activities are
incidental to commercial activities and vice versa. Thoughtful,
consistent application of the Roberts balancing test would result in a
spectrum of levels of protection because the degree of deference to
an organization's expressive activity will vary depending on the
amount of the group's expressive activities, and the degree of state
interest will vary depending on the group's commercial activities. An
association which is primarily expressive but engages in a small
amount of non-incidental commercial activity has a strong interest in
freedom of expressive association, whereas the state's interest in
119. Professor Richard Epstein argues that all private associations should have the same
protection of membership decisions as the Boy Scouts of America does, and antidiscrimination
laws should only prevail over freedom of association where the discriminatory organization
enjoys a monopoly. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Perils of Moderation: The Case of
the Boy Scouts, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 119, 120 (2000). Epstein recognizes that his libertarian
approach "call[s] for the constitutional invalidation of much of the Civil Rights Act, including
Title VII insofar as it relates to employment." Id. at 139. The radical departure from existing
First Amendment law that Epstein advocates is beyond the scope of this Comment, but portions
of his analysis are very useful for the present endeavor. For example, Epstein points out that
but for the provision in New Jersey's law exempting organizations that are "reasonably
restricted exclusively to one sex," the analysis Justice Stevens advocated would require the Boy
Scouts to admit girls as troop members, since the Boy Scouts does not believe that "girls are
immoral per se." Id. at 130 (quoting N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(f) (West 1993)). Allowing
primarily expressive groups to limit their activities to members of one gender allows for a
comprehensive approach to the conflicts between antidiscrimination laws and freedom of
expressive association rather than requiring exceptions for generally accepted membership
policies.
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eradicating discrimination in expressive associations is fairly low
because of the minimal impact on individuals' social liberty. An
association such as the Jaycees, which is primarily economic though it
engages in some expressive activity, has a lesser interest in freedom of
expressive association, whereas the state's interest in eradicating
discrimination is heightened because of the economic nature of the
group.
Thus, an organization's interest in freedom of expressive asso-
ciation is proportionate to the amount of its activity that is purely
expressive (as distinguished from incidentally expressive), whereas
the state's interest in eradicating discrimination is strongest in
relation to that part of the organization's activities that affect
individuals' social liberty, particularly economic activities. The more
integral the expression is to the group's overall activities, the greater
the organization's interest in relation to the state's interest. Similarly,
the more elemental the right involved is to social liberty, the stronger
the state's compelling interest in eradicating discrimination will
become in relation to the group's interest in freedom of expression. 120
Put another way, although the Roberts analysis indicates a state's
interest in ending discrimination is compelling, the state's interest in
eradicating discrimination is not always equally compelling. A
governmental interest in providing equal access to economic
opportunity, transportation, or literacy is more compelling than a
governmental interest in ensuring equal access to social opportunities
because the governmental interest is higher with respect to activities
that facilitate the participation of independent, self-supporting
citizens in the activities of the state.
Recognition of varying degrees of governmental and organiza-
tional interest in membership decisions will enliven the Roberts test,
increasing its utility and providing structure for analysis of conflicts
between freedom of expressive association and antidiscrimination
laws. This "spectrum framework" shows that Dale's recognition of
the absolute rights of purely expressive associations can be
understood to reflect the development of a more comprehensive
approach to freedom of expressive association than the language of
the opinion reflects.
120. O'Connor's Roberts concurrence addresses only economic and expressive groups, but
states have important interests in ensuring equal access to other types of opportunities that are
essential to liberty, such as education and housing.
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3. Absolute First Amendment Protection of Expressive
Associations' Membership Policies Will Not Create an "Easy Trump"
of Antidiscrimination Laws
The Dale dissents expressed concern that Dale makes freedom of
expressive association an easy way for organizations to avoid the
requirements of antidiscrimination laws.121  The Dale majority
believed that it would not be easy to fake freedom of expressive
association claims to avoid the application of antidiscrimination
laws,122 but did not adequately explain how courts would recognize
such claims. Understanding the outcome in Dale as part of a larger
framework that only gives great deference to purely expressive
organizations shows that such protection will not undermine the
effectiveness of antidiscrimination laws.
Associations that are not primarily expressive will not be able to
package themselves as such to avoid application of state antidiscrimi-
nation laws because courts will look not only to the written materials
of the organization but also to the primary activities of the association
and the members' reasons for participation.12 Including a written
objective relating to the discrimination cannot, of itself, protect a
group from antidiscrimination laws, nor is it prerequisite to such
protection.' 24 The Jaycees and Rotary Club would not have been able
to package themselves as primarily expressive because most of their
economic activities were independent from their expressive activities.
Furthermore, members typically joined for economic reasons and for
professional development, and treated membership fees as a business
expense. Based on the public accommodation status and economic
121. See, e.g., 530 U.S. 640, 688 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[s]hielding a litigant's
claim from judicial scrutiny would.., render civil rights legislation a nullity"); Id. at 701-02
(Souter, J., dissenting) (reasoning that allowing associations to claim a right of expressive
association "without identifying a clear position.., would convert the right of expressive
association into an easy trump of any antidiscrimination law").
122. 530 U.S. at 653-54.
123. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
124. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27. The confusion caused by the Dale court's look at
the Boy Scouts' position statements is unnecessary since the position statements were
superfluous for the purposes of the Court's analysis. The Court said that the Boy Scouts did not
have to present evidence of its expression. 530 U.S. at 652-53. Thus, even if the Dale analysis
were applied to the facts of Roberts, it seems that the Jaycees would not necessarily have
prevailed if they had presented the Court with an internal document that says women are
inferior or that women should not work out of the home because they are not entitled to the
same degree of deference as the Boy Scouts. The problem of freedom of association potentially
being an easy trump of civil rights laws is also addressed if the Dale case is understood as the
Boy Scouts arguing that its primary mission is to promote "family values."
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nature of the enterprise, the group's exclusionary membership policy
should not be entitled to absolute deference. Where the group is not
purely expressive, "[tihe right to associate for expressive purposes is
not... absolute."125  Simply engaging in some "not insubstantial"
amount of expressive activity will not save an organization that is not
primarily expressive from the reach of antidiscrimination laws. 12 The
law firm in Hishon v. King & Spalding, moreover, would not have
been able to avoid antidiscrimination laws by engaging in expressive
activity because, given the overarching purpose of the organization
(commercial law) and the members' reason for joining (earning a
living), the law firm's freedom of association claim would have been
slight compared to a government interest in eradicating discrimi-
nation against women.127
Some commentators, as well as the dissenting opinions in Dale,
argued that the Court should limit itself to objective evidence of a
discriminatory message.12 This approach does not sufficiently protect
First Amendment rights because a particular belief may be so obvious
to an organization's members and audience that the organization has
not written it down or made formal expression on the topic.
29
Conversely, an expressive association might not anticipate or
recognize certain of its characteristics or membership qualifications
until a certain person sought inclusion, but once such a person
appeared, it would become clear to the members that the inclusion of
that individual would interfere with the group's legitimate expressive
activities. 13° Using the spectrum framework to determine what degree
of deference a group's membership decisions should be afforded
prevents organizations that are not purely expressive from improperly
125. Cf Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
126. See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617 (noting that the Jaycees engaged in some "not
insubstantial" amount of protected expression).
127. No evidence was presented in Hishon that the firm engaged in protected expression.
467 U.S. 69 (1984).
128. See, e.g., 530 U.S. at 687 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 A.2d
1196, 1230 (N.J. 1999) (Handler, J., concurring); Cara J. Frey, Note, Hate Exposed to the Light
of Day: Determining the Boy Scouts of America's Expressive Purpose Solely from Objective
Evidence, 75 WASH. L. REV. 577, 579 (2000).
129. For example, Paul Varnell points out that "the only reason the Boy Scouts never made
opposition to homosexuality an explicit part of its 'core' message was that there was never any
doubt about the moral status of homosexuality, so it did not need to." Paul Varnell,
Heterosexual Scouts of America, Cm-. FREE PRESS, July 5, 2000, at 13.
130. One can imagine a neighborhood association whose members all belong to one cultural
group, whose expressive activities would be impeded by the presence of an unwanted member




using freedom of association to legitimize discriminatory membership
and hiring practices.
4. Allowing Primarily Expressive Associations Absolute First
Amendment Protection of Membership Decisions is Justified in Light
of the Rationales for Freedom of Expression
Because associational freedoms are derived from the First
Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly,"' the justifications for
freedom of expressive association are bound up with the justifications
for freedom of expression. Common explanations for the freedom of
expression are: (1) freedom of expression promotes democracy and
self-governance; (2) freedom of expression promotes the search for
truth; (3) freedom of expression is an important end in itself because
it promotes self-realization; and (4) freedom of expression, by
requiring tolerance, promotes more tolerance. 132 The outcome in
Dale and the approach advocated in this Comment are justified in
light of these considerations.1
33
a. Democratic Self-Government
The outcome in Dale and the spectrum approach advocated by
this Comment protect the free flow of information central to the
democratic process. If individuals are to effectively contribute to the
political process, joining with others to contribute to the debate helps
to ensure that viewpoints will be heard and taken into consideration
by the voting public134 Protecting a purely expressive group's right to
131. Dale, 530 U.S. at 647-48; Roberts, 469 U.S. at 622. The Supreme Court has declared
that the "freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an
inseparable aspect of the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech." NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
132. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 751-56
(1997).
133. To make sense of freedom of expression, it is helpful to use more than one of these
justifications. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 5 (1992);
LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 579 (1st ed. 1978). One could also
embrace Rodney Smolla's argument when he writes:
At its most general level, freedom of speech in the United States needs no functional
theories like "the marketplace of ideas" or "the self-fulfillment of the speaker" to
support it, but rather is justified by the elegantly simple rationale that what speakers
say or journalists print should be decided by speakers and journalists, and not by
governments.
SMOLLA, supra, at 5.
134. Major proponents of this view include ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM (1960); Lillian BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978); Vincent Blasi, The Checking
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organize and to include only those individuals it thinks will effectively
promote its message ensures that each voice in the debate is robust,
undiluted by individuals that a group would rather not include.
A group that communicates disagreement with government
action contributes to democratic self-government. Government
action that inhibits the formation of a group that disagrees publicly or
privately with the government action or social condition negatively
affects the functioning of our democratic system. Thus, allowing
purely expressive groups absolute First Amendment protection in
membership preserves self-government regardless of the degree or
nature of disagreement with government action or social condition.
Although application of antidiscrimination laws restricting member-
ship decisions of organizations that are not purely expressive
implicates the principle of self-government, it does not directly violate
the principle.
An expressive group's private expression (or nonexpression, in
the case of the Boy Scouts' desire not to speak on matters of
sexuality) contributes to the political process as much as public
expression does. For example, the Boy Scouts' policy of remaining
silent on matters of sexuality serves to silence and close off debate
about proper sexuality-thus sending the message that things should
continue as they have been, that no change is necessary. The Boy
Scouts' decision not to publicize its discriminatory membership policy
does not preclude individuals who are excluded on the basis of
personal characteristics from publicizing their experience. Thus, the
robust discourse envisioned by political theories of the First
Amendment is achieved and not undermined.
b. Attainment of Truth
Ensuring that groups primarily engaged in expressive activity can
determine their membership without government interference also
promotes the attainment of truth. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
argued in his famous dissent in Abrams v. United States that truth
should be protected because truth is most likely to emerge from the
clash of opinions in the "marketplace of ideas.1 35
Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 523; Robert Bork, Neutral
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Harry Kalven, The New
York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 SuP. CT.
REV. 191; Cass Sunstein, Hard Defamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891 (1984).
135. 250 U.S. 616,630 (1919). This idea had earlier been expressed by John Stuart Mill, who
wrote that the "peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the
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Although some scholars reject the truth-seeking rationale for
First Amendment protections because it does not recognize the
inequality of access to the marketplace of ideas, and because it is not
obvious that truth will prevail in the marketplace,1 36 the notion
remains a strong tradition in American jurisprudence. As exempli-
fied by the nationwide debate over the Boy Scouts' exclusionary
policies, 137 the metaphoric marketplace of ideas can work very
effectively. Individuals and organizations are free to choose whether
or not to support the Boy Scouts in light of their discriminatory
policies, thus enhancing the intellectual development of the nation.
Increased participation in the marketplace of ideas makes the
attainment of truth more likely. Furthermore, nonapplication of an
antidiscrimination law to a purely expressive organization does not
heavily disadvantage excluded individuals because other social and
expressive organizations exist or can be formed. 138 Public debate
about discriminatory membership policy is preferable to silent but
begrudging acquiescence to New Jersey's antidiscrimination law, or
worse, covert discrimination.
c. Advancing Autonomy
The spectrum approach protects autonomy to a greater degree
than the Roberts trilogy or Dale taken alone. C. Edwin Baker is the
chief proponent of the theory that speech is intrinsically important
because it is the means by which individuals define themselves in the
world. 39 Just as association among gays and lesbians plays an
human race; posterity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still
more than those who hold it." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (David Spitz ed., W. W.
Norton & Co. 1975) (1859).
136. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989);
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, The Sexual Politics of the First Amendment, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED 206, 209-10 (1987); Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First
Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641 (1967); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A
Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1.
137. See, e.g., David France et al., Scouts Divided, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 2001, at 44.
138. For example, youth organizations that do not discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation include the Boys and Girls Clubs of America, the National 4-H Council, Camp Fire
Boys and Girls, the Girl Scouts, Jewish Community Centers, and the YMCA. In the context of
services more vital to individual, social, and economic welfare, such as hotel accommodations,
the fact that another hotel may not discriminate or that those discriminated against could start
their own hotel is not persuasive. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964).
139. C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.




important role in the exploration and development of identity,14°
association limited to heterosexuals can be instrumental in the
development of individual identity as well. People who believe that
homosexuality is immoral can develop their autonomy by expressing
their views and sharing time with others who have similar opinions in
the context of an expressive association.14 Responding to discrimi-
natory expression can also be empowering to individuals who
disagree with the discriminatory speech. Permitting discrimination of
this sort in employment, organized labor, or education contexts will
harm the autonomy of excluded individuals to a greater degree than
others' autonomy will be promoted because of the fundamental
nature of the rights involved. Thus, the spectrum approach provides
maximal protection for autonomy interests within purely expressive
groups and hybrid groups.
d. Promoting Tolerance
The protection of discriminatory membership policies in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale effectively demonstrates Lee Bollinger's
theory that promoting tolerance is an important force behind the First
Amendment. 142  Bollinger suggests that protecting expression of
intolerance values expression not for the positive contributions it
makes to social progress, but precisely for its lack of value,1 43 that the
protection of speech "serves to... hold up before us[] that which we
aspire to avoid."1 Witnesses to intolerant speech are afforded the
opportunity to evaluate their own perceptions about the subject of
the intolerant speech and to embrace tolerance in light of abhorrent
intolerant speech. 145
140. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 181 (1999).
141. It is also useful to note that the Boy Scouts is not engaging in hate speech, but is simply
expressing its moral disagreement by restricting membership.
142. LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 140 (1986). Contra, e.g., David Strauss,
Why Be Tolerant? 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485 (1986). Bollinger himself recognizes that tolerance
is not always a virtue, nor intolerance always a vice. BOLLINGER, supra, at 11.
143. See BOLLINGER, supra note 142, at 140.
144. Id. at 126.
145. Bollinger writes:
It can be extremely unsettling to see our own bad qualities reflected in the behavior of
others; it draws our attention to what we regularly close off, or censor, from our minds.
But such unsettling feelings can turn into abhorrence when we see those bad qualities
under intense magnification, when we thus have put before us the potential course of
those bad tendencies we sense within ourselves .... And it is the intolerance we feel
toward our own intolerance that contributes to our wanting to censor the external,
exaggerated reflection of that part of ourselves.
Id. at 127. See also Mar J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's
[Vol 77:373
A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH
Thus, knowledge of the Boy Scouts' exclusionary policies gives
individuals an opportunity to reflect on their own perceptions of
homosexuality and appropriate roles for gays and lesbians in society,
to reject their prejudices, or simply to recognize that they exist.14
6
Protecting intolerant expression also allows others to take part in
social means of deterrence of inappropriate or unwanted speech.147 In
this sense, law functions as a "major project concerned with nothing
less than helping to shape the intellectual character of the society."'
148
Protecting intolerant membership policies in hybrid commercial-
expressive organizations does not further this goal of promoting
tolerance because the exclusionary policy goes far beyond the
expression of intolerance that gives rise to desired mental processes.
Discriminatory policies in hybrid organizations can deprive people of
meaningful participation in society. Thus, the spectrum approach
ensures the most efficient promotion of tolerance by regulating
membership decisions of some hybrid groups and allowing individuals
opportunity to evaluate their own perceptions by protecting
membership decisions of purely expressive groups.
IV. THE PERSONAL IS POLITICAL-BEYOND THEORY INTO LAW?
Providing absolute First Amendment protection for expressive
associations to determine their membership but limiting protection
for hybrid groups to discriminate in their membership policies allows
individuals to function in society without their personal lives
becoming excessively politicized. Only where necessary to protect
first amendment freedoms will an individual's personal characteristics
keep him or her from participating in activities, thus limiting the
legalization of the notion that "the personal is political."
Story, 87 MicH. L. REV. 2320, 2369 (1989) (recognizing concerns that some individuals miss
entirely sarcastic messages and simply enjoy racist dialogue on its face).
146. Even a dialogue ending with, "Well, I don't know why I don't want my child in a Boy
Scout troop with a gay scout leader, I just don't," has brought the speaker closer to tolerance by
recognizing intolerance and the lack of reason behind it. Bollinger writes that his tolerance
approach is in a broad way consistent with a commitment to pluralism. Id. at 242-43.
147. Id. at 12-13, 29. Social intolerance may well be more powerful than legal intolerance.
Id. at 109-10.
148. BOLLINGER, supra note 142, at 107. Of course, in cases where racist or homophobic
language is commonplace and accepted, the result may be the opposite-people may adopt such
views without conscious thought. Nevertheless, our system of government presumes that
individuals are autonomous, active individuals who are conscious of their decisions, not sheep
who follow the herd. See Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133, 178-79 (1982).
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The slogan "the personal is political" took root in the second-
wave feminism of the 1970s. 149 Originally, the catchphrase recognized
that personal circumstances are molded and defined by the broader
social and political setting in which they arise. In order to improve
one's individual situation, it is necessary to address the context in
which the oppression arose. Later, the saying came to mean that
individual choices have political implications. For example, the
choice to bear children, to shop at The Gap, or to follow a vegetarian
diet is both a personal and a political decision. This latter meaning is
frequently used in contemporary thought, and is the one William
Eskridge uses when he writes: "[f]or gays, as much as for feminists,
the personal is the political."' 150
Eskridge continues: "Following the feminist lesson that the
private is public, post-Stonewall gay activism teaches that revelation
of personal sexual identity not only has political effects, but that
tolerance of gay people does not happen without people coming out
of their closets."1' For Eskridge, if gays and lesbians are to achieve
meaningful social change, they must contribute to the "diverse and
robust polity that the First Amendment envisions. ' ' 152 This idea finds
support in case law, as well. For example, in Gay Law Students Ass'n
v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,L53 the California Supreme
Court recognized self-identification as gay to be political speech
because "an important aspect of the struggle for equal rights is to
induce homosexual individuals to 'come out of the closet,' acknowl-
edge their sexual preferences, and to associate with others in working
for equal rights."'5
4
Other theorists argue that when the personal becomes political,
important autonomy interests may be undermined. For example,
Vincent Samar explains how information that is private with respect
to some individuals or segments of society may not be private with
respect to others, and vice versa.'55 The possibility of selective
149. THE NEW BEACON BOOK OF QUOTATIONS BY WOMEN 534 (Rosalie Maggio ed.,
1996); MAGGIE HUMM, THE DICTIONARY OF FEMINIST THEORY 204 (2d ed. 1995).
150. ESKRIDGE, supra note 140, at 181.
151. Id. at 202.
152. Id. at 180. For Eskridge, this goal is achieved by self-identification as well as by
expressions of affection, from public hand-holding to private sexual conduct. Id.
153. 595 P.2d 592 (Cal. 1979).
154. Id. at 610.
155. VINCENT J. SAMAR, THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 64-65 (1991). Samar writes:
[W]hile the amount of one's income may be private with respect to certain members of
one's family, the law provides that it is not private with respect to the IRS. On the
other hand, whether or not one wears a toupee may not be private with respect to
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disclosure avoids possible chilling effects on private acts from sexual
activities to business transactions.15
6
To promote the development of a tolerant society, antidiscrimi-
nation laws such as New Jersey's Law Against Discrimination
recognize that the personal cannot always be political if we are to
have a just or efficient society. By protecting individuals' privacy in
the sphere of employment or public accommodations, such laws allow
people freedom to come out of the closet, organize, and form a
collective voice. In instances where members of a particular group
may not recognize each other unless they self-identify, it is particu-
larly important not to stifle First Amendment expression and the
development of a diverse and robust polity by penalizing individuals
who do self-identify. 57 Thus, where integral elements of social liberty
these same family members, but it is not the business of the IRS. Similarly, certain acts
(such as having an abortion) are private with respect to the state (so long as the fetus is
not considered to be a person and there is no jeopardy to the mother's health).
Id. Samar states that "[ain action is ... private with respect to a group of other actors if and
only if the consequences of the act impinge on the first instance of the actor and not on the
interests of the specified class of actors." Id. at 68. From this definition, Samar derives a
definition of a private state of affairs: "[a] state of affairs is private with respect to a group of
other actors if and only if there is a convention, recognized by the members of the group, that
defines, protects, preserves, or guards that state of affairs for the performance of private acts."
Id. at 73.
156. Id. at 74. Despite the benefits of such an approach, a right to selectively disclose
personal information is not generally understood as legally cognizable. For example, in Sipple
v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 201 Cal. Rptr. 665 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), a California court dismissed
Oliver Sipple's claims that national newspapers' publication of his homosexuality constituted an
invasion of privacy. In September 1975, Oliver Sipple diverted the gunshot that Sara Jane
Moore intended for President Ford outside a San Francisco hotel, and newspaper accounts of
the occurrence included the fact that Sipple was a prominent member of San Francisco's gay
community. As a result, Sipple's family, located in the Midwest, which had not previously
known of his sexual orientation, abandoned him, and Sipple was further "exposed to contempt
and ridicule causing him great mental anguish, embarrassment and humiliation." Id. at 667.
The California Court of Appeals found that Sipple's sexual orientation was not private because
it was publicly known in San Francisco, where he frequented gay bars, gay parades, and other
"homosexual gatherings," and because hundreds of people in other communities across the
country knew of Sipple's sexual orientation. Id. at 668-69. Thus, although Sipple would have
liked to confine the knowledge of his sexual orientation to the gay community, or to any
community other than ones that included his family, selective disclosure of private information
is not a legally cognizable right.
157. Justice Handler's concurrence to the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Dale
illustrates this point. 734 A.2d 1196, 1237-45 (Handler, J. concurring). Justice Handler writes:
"The importance of self-identifying speech inheres in its legal effect-that is, in the functional
capacity of such speech to disclose or clarify the status of a person when that status is entitled to
protection against discrimination." Id. at 1238. "Stereotypes cannot be invoked to extend the
meaning of self-identifying expression of one's own sexual orientation, and thereby become a
vehicle for discrimination against homosexuals." Id. at 1245.
It is also useful to note that a person who self-identifies as gay or lesbian does not propound
a set of beliefs. A woman who identifies as a feminist is subscribing to a set of beliefs (however
amorphous). Her identity remains "woman"; "feminist" is ideology. Self-identifying as gay or
lesbian is an expression of (otherwise unknown) identity, not an expression of ideology.
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are concerned, state proscription of discrimination benefits society as
a whole by expanding the depth of public discourse. State interfer-
ence with discrimination by purely expressive associations, on the
other hand, would negatively affect individuals' ability to organize
and to engage in protected expression. 15 8
Richardson v. Chicago Area Council of the Boy Scouts of
America159 recognized the necessity of separating an individual's
sexual orientation from that person's ability to participate meaning-
fully in the economy. Richardson held that the Boy Scouts'
opposition to homosexuality constitutes a discriminatory hiring
practice prohibited by the Chicago Human Rights Ordinance, 16 and
enjoined the Boy Scouts from using sexual orientation as a factor in
making hiring decisions within Chicago.' 61 In light of Dale, what the
Richardson court failed to recognize is that not all employers are
created alike. While it is permissible for the state to remove the
personal from the political in public employment and in ordinary
private employment, governments may not interfere with the hiring
practices of organizations which primarily engage in expression
protected by the First Amendment. Government manipulation of
hiring decisions will hinder the creation of a collective voice in much
the same way that manipulation of membership policies does.
Thus, the concept that "the personal is political" is legally man-
dated insofar as participation in purely expressive associations is
concerned. Outside of that arena, an individual has a right to choose
whether to politicize identity.
158. Richard E. Sincere, Jr., Pro-Gay Ruling in New Jersey Hurts Gay Rights, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 11, 1999, at A18. Responding to the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision prohibiting the
Boy Scouts from discriminating against Dale on the basis of his sexual orientation, Sincere
writes:
Thus, although far from its intent, the court's decision undermines the right of gay
men and lesbians to seek and maintain "queer-safe space" such as social clubs,
fraternities and sororities, and social-service organizations like Washington, D.C.'s
Sexual Minority Youth Assistance League. Very few gay teenagers are likely to attend
Saturday afternoon rap sessions to discuss personal problems with their peers if they
know that they might be forced to share this private space with heterosexual teens.
The court's decision also makes it harder for homosexuals to combat government-
based discrimination. For example, freedom of association is the key to overturning
the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, which gave state
governments the authority to regulate our most intimate associations-sexual
relationships. Similarly, the right of homosexuals to associate with whom we wish,
when we wish, where we wish, will be an important factor in overturning... various
state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage.
Id.
159. No. 92-E-80, 1996 WL 734724 (Chi. Comm'n on Human Relations Feb. 21, 1996).
160. Chi. Mun. Ordinance § 2-160-010 to § 2-160-120.




Viewed in the context of the framework laid out in this Com-
ment, the Dale decision protects the rights of all people, including
minority groups, to maintain private expressive associations without
the interference of unwanted outsiders. 162  It ensures that debate on
matters of public importance will be "uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open."'163 The spectrum approach advocated here also serves to
protect the personal from becoming political in arenas where it
should be private, and ensures that organizations will not be able to
use freedom of expressive association as an easy trump of antidis-
crimination laws.
Of course, people who disagree with the Boy Scouts' discrimina-
tory policies should continue to work to see that the extensive federal,
state, and local government ties to the Boy Scouts are severed.
164
Nonetheless, the shortcomings in the Court's analysis should not
obscure the doctrinal value of Boy Scouts of America v. Dale.
162. Paul Vamell writes:
[Fireedom of association is an important principle for gays, as for any minority, and
one we should not want to see compromised, even for a short term gain. We relied
heavily on arguments for freedom of association during the early years of the gay
movement when we had to defend our right to form gay clubs, gay political groups and
gay student groups. It is no less important a principle now that our right to form gay
groups is no longer generally contested. It might be contested again sometime.
Paul Varnell, Scouting the Gay Ban, CHi. FREE PRESS, Oct. 20, 1999, at 13.
163. See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
164. As Paul Varnell succinctly puts it: "No gay tax money for anti-gay discriminators."
Varnell, supra note 162. See also Andrew R. Varcoe, The Boy Scouts and the First Amendment:
Constitutional Limits on the Reach of Anti-Discrimination Law, 9 LAW & SEXUALITY 163, 167
(2000). Elsewhere, Varnell suggests that individuals "sue to prevent governmental entities from
sponsoring or subsidizing Boy Scout troops or permitting the use of governmental facilities not
open to other religious groups." Varnell, supra note 129, at 13. The Boy Scouts' governmental
ties include a federal charter, the United States President acting as honorary president of the
Boy Scouts, and local fire and police department sponsorship of Boy Scout troops.
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